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This paper uses longitudinal data to explore whether greater job status makes a person 
healthier. Taking the evidence as a whole, promotees do not exhibit a health improvement 
after promotion. Instead the data suggest that workers with good health are more likely to be 
promoted. In the private sector, we find that job promotion significantly worsens people’s 
psychological strain (on a GHQ score). For the public sector, there are some tentative signs 
of the reverse. We discuss caveats to our conclusions, suggest caution in their interpretation, 
and argue that further longitudinal studies are needed. 
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1. Introduction 
Individuals of high occupational status have good health and low rates of 
premature mortality.  The difficulty for the statistical investigator is to know how to 
interpret this cross-section association.  Is it causal? 
In this paper we attempt to implement a longitudinal test of the hypothesis that 
improvements in occupational status lead to better health.  The focus is on 
individuals’ job rank, and thus approximately their degree of control, within the 
workplace.  We draw upon a panel data set, collected annually between 1991 and 
2005, with information on approximately 1000 individual promotions.  We follow 
what happens to the health of those who gain seniority when compared to the health 
of those who do not.  With one exception, this paper does not find evidence in favour 
of a status-causes-health theory.  Those who are promoted are significantly healthier 
before their promotion, and job promotion in many instances apparently brings about 
a worsening of mental health.  However, after being promoted to the position of 
manager, people do go on to reduce by approximately 10% the number of times they 
visit their doctor.   
Early cross-sectional evidence emerged from a study of the British civil 
service (Bosma et al. 1997; Marmot et al. 1978; Marmot, Shipley and Rose 1984; 
Marmot et al. 1991).  In interesting and influential work, researchers such as Marmot 
(2004) and Wilkinson (2001) have argued that there is a cause-and-effect connection 
running from status to health.  According to this account, high status may itself boost 
health.  It is argued that feelings of inadequacy, anxiety and ultimately a lack of life 
control can arise from low job and social status.  Such psychosocial stressors are 
detrimental to the human condition, especially to cardiovascular health and the auto-
  1immune system, and they can explain much of the social health gradient (Marmot et 
al. 1997).  Griffin et al. (2002) and others have argued that greater control at work 
also improves mental health.  
Evidence for causation from health to status comes principally from cross-
sections.  The existence of a positive association between health and occupation, the 
so-called health gradient, is undisputed (Johnson, Sorlie and Backlund 1999; Macleod 
et al. 2005; Marmot, Shipley and Rose 1984).  Nevertheless, for reasons of data 
availability, there has remained a shortage of longitudinal analysis.  Untangling the 
relationship between human health and socio-economic status is also a complicated 
task.  Whilst there may be a causal chain running from status to health, it may also 
operate in the opposite direction, with the healthiest individuals going on to obtain the 
higher status (Deaton 2003; Smith 1999; West 1991). Alternatively, a third 
unobservable influence, such as genetic factors, could cause both good health and job 
success (Adams et al. 2003; Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney 2006). 
Using various SES indicators, attempts have been made to address the 
problem of causality. For example, Adams et al (2003) for the US and Adda, 
Chandola and Marmot (2003) for Sweden and the UK use longitudinal data and 
control for initial health. No clear causal effects from SES to health are found. 
Similarly, Gardner and Oswald (2004) control for initial health at T in an annual panel 
on individuals and find that income does not influence survival probability at T+10. 
Whilst they adjust for pre-existing health conditions, these studies cannot discount the 
possibility that individuals’ early health led to their SES. Using instrumental 
variables, however, Ettner (1996) argues that more income appears to result in 
significantly better physical and mental health. Lorgelly and Lindley (2008) also find, 
using fixed effects regressions, that although absolute income influences health, there 
  2are no independent effects of either relative income or income inequality. Wilkinson 
(1986) examines the link between changes to both occupational mortality and 
occupational incomes over a twenty year period; however, the units of observation in 
his study are occupations rather than data on individuals. 
The fact that researchers can manipulate the social hierarchy of animals makes 
the research on rank’s effect on animal health of interest. Sapolsky (2004) 
experimentally documents that health consequences emerge relatively quickly after 
rank is established across groups of animals, including monkeys.  Sapolsky (2004) 
further suggests that this pattern extends to humans. However, the social context 
differs across species.  For example, subordinate animals that embark in cooperative 
breeding (Abbott et al. 1998) generally do not suffer from elevated release of 
glucocorticoids, a classic negative stress response documented in Sapolsky, Romero 
and Munck (2000).  Similarly, this stress response within species is dependent on 
whether the subordinate animals are subjected to high levels of harassment by 
dominant individuals and whether they have social support networks (Abbott et al. 
2003).  
Exogenous manipulation of a human individual’s status is not possible, but 
near-experiments potentially provide a way in which one might try to uncover causal 
effects. Rablen and Oswald (2008) offer support for a causal effect, running from 
social status to health, in the upper echelons of society.  They demonstrate that Nobel 
Prize winners live approximately one to two years longer than those merely 
nominated for the Prize.  Their results are similar to, though use more controls and 
different statistical methods than, that of an analysis of Academy Award winners 
carried out by Redelmeier and Singh (2001).  Although both studies are suggestive, an 
inference of causality needs the strong assumption that winners and near-winners are 
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quasi-experiment in the realm of income. They find, counter-intuitively, that those 
with higher incomes as a result of changes to social security payments also have 
greater mortality rates. This result is somewhat consistent with findings by Ruhm 
(2000) that temporary upturns in the economy are bad for people’s health. 
One version of the causality argument suggests that access to resources in the 
form of income plays only a small part in explaining health differences (Marmot 
2004; Wilkinson 2001).  Nevertheless, the correlation between health and income is 
strong (recent econometric evidence includes Cantarero and Pascual (2005), Duleep 
(1986), Frijters, Haisken-DeNew and Shields (2005), McDonough et al. (1997), 
Menchik (1993) and Wolfson et al. (1993)) and similarly so for education (Feldman et 
al. 1989; Lahelma and Valkonen 1990). Income, education and occupation all give 
fairly good indications of an individual’s socio-economic status (SES).  Duncan et al 
(2002) argue that economic measures, such as pay, are preferable over the traditional 
measures of SES.  Yet income will correlate well with psychosocial aspects and 
therefore with health.  It is important to isolate independent SES effects, although 
exclusion of  correlated variables will bias the estimates (Fuchs 2004).  
The work environment offers a useful background to uncover possible 
psychosocial aspects of status while allowing other SES indicators, such as income 
and education, to be held constant.  Consistent with this line of thinking, Ala-Mursula 
et al (2005) conclude that women with less work-time control have an increased risk 
of health problems. Fischer and Sousa-Poza (2009) conclude that an increase in job 
satisfaction improves an individual’s health.  Anderson and Marmot (2007) exploit 
differences in promotion rates across departments in the British civil service as an 
instrument for individual promotion.  
  4 
2. Methodology 
Our analysis focuses on one-time improvements in an individual’s 
occupational status.  The methodological idea is a straightforward one.  Consider an 
individual who is promoted at time T.  If causality runs solely from occupational 
status to health, then, after controlling for other factors correlated with health and 
promotion (such as age, education and gender), there should be no significant 
differences, at T-1, in the health of those who are promoted and those who are not 
promoted.  At T+1 there should begin to be a difference.  If there is only reverse 
causality -- that is, causality running from health to occupational status -- then 
promoted individuals should exhibit significantly better health to the same degree at 
both T-1 and after T+1.  Were two-way causality to exist, a promoted group would 
exhibit a combination of these two effects.  Not only would they have better health at 
T-1, but their health would continue to improve compared with that of the not-
promoted group.   
Using longitudinal data, on a large sample of British workers, cross-sectional 
and difference-in-difference methods are used here to explore each of these three 
hypotheses.  It is useful to note that the data set has no identifiers for employers or 
firms.  Our promoted group therefore includes those who improve their occupational 
status internally and those who gain extra seniority after a move to a different 
employer. 
 
3. Data and Estimation Issues 
Seniority and job status come in myriad forms.  An empirical inquiry has to 
make some taxonomic assumption.  In this study, an individual’s role in the 
  5workplace is assumed to be captured by whether they report in the British Household 
Panel Survey that  
: their job is one of… manager, supervisor, or neither of these.  
In the data set, these are uniquely different classifications1, which are similar to those 
used by Macleod et al. (2005).  While this approach necessarily aggregates across 
sectors in a way that may produce some measurement error, it offers an indication of 
the seniority and hence the degree of control each individual can be expected to have 
in the job.  This taxonomy of seniority assumes away complex role overlaps, and 
assumes too that an individual is employed, which means that any association 
between unemployment and poor health will be largely ignored in our main analysis.  
We return later to this issue.   
Data come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a representative 
longitudinal sample of British households. Running from 1991-2005, the Survey 
tracks over 10,000 adults in each of 15 years. Our analysis concentrates on a 
particular proportion of this sample, namely, those who worked for at least five 
consecutive years, from, in our notation, T-1 up to T+3.  We observe who is promoted 
at T2.  This gives us a sample size of up to approximately 17,000 individual five-year 
observations.   
There is some loss to this research design, because we are unable to say 
whether those who left work entirely, or subsequently changed role again, went on as 
a result to have better or worse health3.  But it allows a simple focus upon longitudinal 
health within an individual’s work setting.   
                                                 
1 Those indicating neither of these are denoted here as non-supervisors.  
2 See the Appendix for sample construction notes. 
3 A later section attempts to deal with this issue. 
  6The BHPS contains several indicators of an individual’s health.  Here, we 
make use of three:  
(i)  subjective ill-health,  
(ii)  number of visits to the doctor,  
(iii)  mental strain.  
We do so to allow a degree of corroboration of the regression results on any single 
health variable.  These three variables are coded such that a higher value indicates 
worsening health.  The paper therefore estimates ill-health4 regression equations (we 
use only cardinal methods but ordered estimators give the same results).   
Subjective ill health is a self rating of one’s health on a cardinal 5-point scale, 
where 5=very poor through to 1=excellent.  The number of visits to the doctor -- 
available in BHPS data as a grouped variable -- is another simple measure of how 
healthy an individual might be.  The final dependent variable is that of psychological 
ill-health.  It is captured here using a General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) measure of 
mental strain, on a 0 to 36 scale.  The same variable -- defined more fully in the 
Appendix -- has been used in a large medical and psychiatric literature such as 
Cardozo et al (2000) and Pevalin and Ermisch (2004), and in health-economics 
research by, for example, Shields and Wheatley Price (2005) and Gardner and Oswald 
(2004).  All three variables have positive skew; most individuals mark themselves in 
surveys as relatively healthy.  Individuals’ mean rating of their subjective ill-health is 
2.02.  They visit their doctor (ie, their General Practitioner, or GP, in British jargon) 
on average 1.77 times each year.  This is on a numerical 0-10 scale.  They have mean 
mental strain of 10.76 on a 0-36 scale. A simple correlation matrix is shown in Table 
                                                 
4 A fuller description of the variables is given in the section Notes to Tables at the end of the paper. 
  71.  As might be expected, people who are less healthy on one criterion are more likely 
to be recorded as less healthy on the other two. 
Health declines as people age.  Simple within-promoted group comparisons 
are therefore not likely to be sufficient; we cannot merely measure the same 
individual’s health across T-1 to T+3.  This is illustrated in Table 2, which shows that 
subjective ill health, visits to the GP, and mental strain all deteriorate over a five-year 
period.  Subjective ill-health worsens in Table 2 by 0.07 points; visits to the doctor by 
0.10 points; mental health by 0.39 points.  It is difficult to discern whether declining 
health across time here is due to extraneous factors, or, perhaps more plausibly, to the 
natural process of ageing.  We attempt to overcome this by comparing particular 
individuals’ health levels with those among a control group.  The sample is separated 
into treatment and control groups -- those promoted at T and those never promoted -- 
and comparisons made between them.  
Our study examines three possible types of promotions: workers promoted 
from  
(1) non-supervisor to supervisor,  
(2) supervisor to manager and  
(3) those going directly from non-supervisor to manager.  
The final promotion type represents the largest gain in occupational status.  Each 
promotion case has individuals’ health contrasted to that of an appropriate control 
group, namely, individuals who remain as non-supervisors for promotion types 1 and 
3 and supervisors for the 2
nd promotion category.   
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4. Results 
We begin by depicting the cross-sectional differences in health across levels of 
worker seniority.  This is demonstrated, with gradual inclusion of a set of control 
variables, in Table 3.   
Table 3’s evidence reveals the positive association commonly seen in 
empirical studies of socio-economic status and health. The strongest correlation with 
occupational grade in the table is observed for subjective ill-health.  Managers in 
column 1 of Table 3 report themselves 0.189 points healthier than non-supervisors; 
supervisors are 0.058 points healthier than non-supervisors.  Here the occupational 
variables remain significant even when other socio-economic variables, such as 
income and education, are added to the regression equation. For the number-of-visits-
to-the-GP variable, the evidence in Table 3 is not as clear. The coefficients, although 
beginning with some significance for managers, only border on the 10% level of 
significance once controls are added. Mental strain follows a similar, and slightly 
stronger, pattern. Managers have lower levels of mental strain and the coefficients are 
well defined.  
In Table 3, smoking appears to have the negative consequences that might be 
expected.  Ceteris paribus, women rate their own health worse.  Moreover, they go to 
their doctor more often, and have higher mental strain.  Income, unlike education, 
doesn’t appear to offer an important explanation of an individual’s health. 
Interestingly, the least-educated and the married individuals have significantly lower 
levels of mental strain. Concentrating on subjective health, we can evaluate the 
importance of a position of control in the workplace in light of other variables.  The 
variable for being a manager, for instance, explains nearly as much of the association 
with health as smoking does and is associated with twice the benefit of being educated 
  9to degree level.  Even once we control for the individual’s access to resources and his 
or her education level, large benefits still remain.  
Although confirming decades of previous evidence on the positive association 
between health and socio-economic status, Table 3 should not be viewed as proof of 
causality. 
Table 4 (on promotion from non-supervisor to supervisor), Table 5 (on 
promotion from supervisor to manager) and Table 6 (on promotion from non-
supervisor to manager) move to longitudinal patterns.  The first and third sets of 
promotions draw upon approximately 15,000 worker-year observations and up to 330 
and 324 instances of promotion respectively; the second is based on approximately 
1200 worker-year observations and up to 436 instances of promotion.  These tables 
report both the raw means and the differences between groups -- both with and 
without controls5 -- for subjective ill-health, visits to the doctor, and GHQ mental 
strain.  The data run from T-1 to T+3.  Occupational promotion occurs, by 
construction, at T6.   
Consider the mean differences across the groups found in the second column 
from the end in each table.  In Table 4, the mean reported ill-health of our two main 
groups -- those who will not and those who will later be promoted to the rank of 
supervisor -- is initially similar at 2.02 and 1.97.  In the year of promotion, ill-health 
has fractionally improved, at 1.94, among the workers who do gain seniority.  By 
three years later, the numbers for the two groups are, respectively, 2.09 and 2.04.  
Thus, contrary to the claims that promotion will bring improvements to health, both 
have worsened approximately equally; there is no relative improvement in health 
                                                 
5 The regressions with controls are available upon request. 
6 It is possible to start and end the analysis at different time points, but that greatly reduces the sample 
size without affecting our principal findings. The result of extending the analysis up until T+5, for 
example, is shown in table 8. 
  10among the people who become supervisors.  The Table 4 upper panel’s bottom-right 
number of 0.01, which measures the difference-in-difference, shows that not even 
Type II errors could explain the poor prediction of the promotion leading to better 
health hypothesis.  For the visits-to-the-doctor variable in Table 4, those individuals 
who will go on to be promoted in T show up in the data set as significantly healthier 
in time T-1 than the others.  They have 1.56 visits per year compared to the 1.78 visits 
of the individuals who will not be promoted in T.  By the end of the period, however, 
the T+3 visits score is actually slightly worse among the promotees. The difference-
in-difference estimates even suggest that the health deterioration is much quicker for 
the promoted group using the number of doctor visits to indicate health. The only 
support, from Table 4, that promotion will result in better health is in the lower panel 
of the table, namely, in the data on GHQ mental strain scores.  Here there is a little 
evidence that psychological health worsens faster among the non-promoted in the 
short term.  At T the promoted group have significantly less mental strain than the 
non-promoted group, nevertheless, the improvement in mental strain is not large 
enough to have a significant influence on the difference-in-difference estimator. It 
will be seen later that even this disappears when regression controls are added. 
Table 5 studies those who become managers after having been in a 
supervisory role. There is evidence from the means in the top panel of the table that 
the (future) promotees begin with better subjective health -- by 0.10 points -- than the 
others.  However, although this health gap widens fractionally in certain years, there 
is no persistent improvement after the job promotion.  By T+3, the difference-in-
difference is only 0.02 and positive.   Again, there seems no evidence that promotion 
will improve the individual’s health. 
  11The only stark result on changes in health, in Table 5, is for Doctor Visits.   
This is the -0.33^ number on the change between T-1 and T+1.  Hence, recently 
promoted managers go on to visit their doctor less often.  The effect is large.  As the 
mean of Visits is 1.7, this estimate implies approximately a 20% fall in visits to the 
doctor after promotion to manager.  Moreover, there is some consistency in this 
evidence for an improvement from time T.   For the other time periods, the drop can 
be seen, in the right hand corner of the middle panel of Table 5, to be smaller at 
around -0.2, which when compared to pre-promotion period T-1 corresponds to an 
approximately 10% decline in visits to the GP.  This appears to be more encouraging 
for the claim that taking a promotion improves health (although a critic might 
potentially raise an alternative explanation, namely, that managers simply become 
short of time).   
By contrast, on the GHQ mental strain measure in Table 5, if anything the 
promotees do worse by time T+3.  They begin in T-1 with fractionally better mental 
health and end with slightly worse mental health.  Although the null of zero cannot be 
rejected, the measured relative worsening is 0.32 points.   
Table 6 again studies those who become managers.  However, this case is 
particularly interesting because these people initially begin in a non-supervisory role.  
Hence the table provides information on ‘large’ promotions.  This group of 
individuals, it might be said, are given the greatest boost to their status.  Again there is 
evidence, although now much stronger, that the (future) promotees begin with much 
better health.  Initial subjective and mental ill-health are both significantly better to 
begin with than among those not promoted.  At T, the promoted group even visit the 
doctor significantly fewer times.  These health differences persist but do not 
significantly improve for the subjective ill-health variable up until T+3.  ‘Visits to the 
  12doctor’ does show some significant improvement, much like the other promoted-to-
manager group. Mental stress displays similar patterns to the other promoted-to-
manager group and actually worsens.  However, now the null of zero on this 
difference can be rejected. The promoted group begin with significantly better 
psychological health but by T+3 they have the same mental strain levels as those not 
promoted.  In fact they reach similar levels by T+1 and the difference-in-difference 
estimates are positive and significantly different from zero.  
This result, in the bottom right section of Table 6’s lower panel, runs strongly 
counter to the hypothesis that promotion improves health: those who obtain the largest 
boost to status here seem to show the clearest deterioration in mental health. 
The means of Tables 4, 5 and 6 imply that over a five-year interval, whilst 
appearing to suggest some differences in health across promoted and non-promoted 
groups, any longitudinal health improvements are insignificantly different from zero 
at the 5% significance level.  Both promoted-to-manager groups, however, do in the 
raw data show one significant sign of a health gain.  Most of the nine panels of Tables 
4, 5 and 6 suggest that putative promotees start out as healthier but that no further 
improvement to health comes after the gain in seniority. 
Other factors are associated with health and promotion. The final columns in 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 show the differences between the groups once the time period, age, 
education, gender, marital status and smoking status at T are held constant7. Across 
the first two groups -- those promoted to supervisors and those promoted to managers 
from a supervisory role -- most significant differences have disappeared, or have not 
been accentuated.  In the final group -- those promoted to manager from non-
supervisor -- there is still fairly strong evidence that it is the healthiest individuals 
                                                 
7 The controls match those used earlier in Table 3 but with income excluded.  Some regressions, 
however, with an income control are contained at the end of the paper. 
  13who get promoted, but that the promotion does not appear to offer further benefits to 
their health. This seems discouraging for the proponents of the theory that high work 
status makes people healthy. 
There is some slight evidence from Tables 5 and 6 that those promoted to the 
position of manager show a health improvement in the short term.  Using the visits-to-
the doctor indicator, both groups demonstrate signs of improvement.  For those 
promoted from non-supervisors to supervisors the difference-in-difference estimator 
is only on the border of significance at conventional levels, and is not convincingly 
sustained through the long term to time period T+3. For those promoted to managers 
from non-supervisors, a slower deterioration in health is significant at the 5% level up 
until T+3. Perhaps importantly, a difference-in-difference estimator uncovers only 
slim evidence that promoted groups benefit from more slowly declining health, in 
either the short- or mid-term, when compared to others. In fact, mental health tends to 
deteriorate fastest among those who receive the largest status improvement.  
A plausible conclusion from these results is that causality does not run from 
status to health.  In part, it seems that the healthiest individuals may get promoted in 
at least one of the groups, but this result alone does not fully explain the social health 
gradient initially observed in Table 3.  There is a residual that needs to be explained.  
Arguably the cross-sectional association is driven by a third unobservable factor, such 
as behavioural or genetic factors.  If there is a large benefit from being promoted, as 
potentially suggested by the Whitehall studies, then it is undetectable across our 
observed time frame.  Good health, at least in the long term, apparently does not 
follow from job promotion.  The decline in visits to the doctor of both promoted to 
manager groups in Tables 5 and 6 is the closest to evidence for the contrary.  
 
  145. Objections and Counters 
Our test is a simple one.  It is sensible to consider objections.   
There is much noise in the data.  Hence (Concern #1) we are conscious that 
our findings might in principle be explained by a Type II error.  Moreover, promotion 
is non-random and there are potentially other ways in which the patterns in the data 
could be explained.  These include the possibility that (Concern #2) the promoted 
groups endured substantial health deterioration relative to the control group in the 
years leading up to the promotion, with promotion merely restoring it. Alternatively 
(Concern #3) the individuals who really improve in health might somehow be missed 
from our sub-sample.  This could occur if an individual promoted at T went on to then 
get demoted or promoted within the three years, or even left the work-force 
altogether.  
We try to probe these possible explanations. 
Concern #1 
A simple check on the possibility that our negative conclusions stem from 
Type II errors is to ignore the standard errors and focus on coefficient signs.  In 
Tables 4, 5 and 6, looking at difference-in-differences in the bottom right corner of 
the panels, there are 24 out of 36 negatives when including controls and only 21 
negatives without controls. A second check is to examine the sign on the longer-term 
effects with controls added in these Tables.  This coefficient is negative in only 3 out 
of 9 instances both with and without controls.  These splits do not support the 
hypothesis that promotion improves health. 
Our data set necessarily aggregates across different kinds of work and 
different sectors. Therefore a further argument could be made against the occupational 
status variable. Whilst we expect the individual’s answer to the status variable to have 
  15a large degree of internal consistency, there may be variation across industries.  We 
test this possibility by carrying out the same analysis on individuals who work and 
remain in the manufacturing industry and again separately for the public sector.  The 
results of this check are given in Table 7.  The treatment group declines substantially 
in size, which make it difficult to pick up significant differences.  However, if again 
we leave aside the t-statistics and instead focus only on the coefficient signs for this 
relatively homogenous set of individuals, there are, consistently with the null of 
randomness, 11 instances out of 18 in which there is a negative value.   
Those who get promoted to a supervisory position in the public sector become 
significantly less stressed.  Evidence for this is found in spite of the small treatment 
group. A further look at those promoted to manager from the supervisor position 
shows a coefficient that, although insignificant, is of a similar magnitude. The 
difference-in-difference estimate of the large promotion group (non-supervisors to 
managers) also exhibits a positive coefficient. The sample sizes are very small but 
could be indicative of a protective health effect that is unique only to public sector 
workers. Combining all three promotion types increases the sample size, and the 
effect of any promotion in the public sector is also analysed in Table 7. It seems that 
those promoted in the public sector do experience some relative improvement in their 
mental strain by around 2.7 points. This improvement is large at around 25% of mean 
levels and significantly different from zero at conventional levels.  
The improvement to mental strain found in the public sector is in contrast to 
our previous finding, in the whole sample, that mental stress significantly worsened 
across some promotion groups in the wider population. It could be that the public 
sector has special features that make it possible to gain health protection from 
  16improved work status. (The important work of Marmot and colleagues was on 
employees working in the civil service). 
Table 8 extends the period of analysis and tests whether the promoted group 
have a slower deterioration in health up until T+5. Table 8 further investigates 
whether those individuals who stay at the same address for the entire five year 
analysis -- T-1 to T+3 -- gain any benefits to their health. Since no firm-level 
indicators are available, use of the individual’s address allows us to eliminate some of 
those individuals who may have moved firms. Neither test yields results supportive of 
the promotion-leads-to-health hypothesis.  
Concern #2 
To deal with the second objection, it is necessary to determine whether, prior 
to promotion, (i) poor health or (ii) steadily deteriorating health somehow predicts 
promotion at T.  Tables 4, 5 and 6 contradict (i), showing that healthier individuals get 
promoted; on (ii), probit estimation can be carried out across each promotion 
category, with deteriorating health (health measure at T-1 minus T) used as a 
predictor of promotion.  Results are shown in Table 9 and we observe that the null of 
zero on the coefficients cannot be rejected.  The positive coefficients imply, although 
mostly insignificantly different from zero, that individuals had a slower deterioration 
in health before promotion.  This adds some weight to the argument that there is a 3
rd 
variable driving their promotion and health.  Interestingly, women seem more likely 
to be promoted to a managerial position from a supervisory role but are less likely to 
figure in either of the other two groups.  Education, as might be expected, is also a 
strong predictor of later promotion. 
Concern #3 
  17The third objection is more difficult to overcome. Promoted individuals are 
lost from the sample on three accounts: they get further promoted or demoted within 
the three years; they leave the workforce; or they exit the BHPS completely. On this 
last point, little can be done.  However, it is hard to see, intuitively, why the 
particularly healthy people should exhibit high attrition from the panel.  The first two, 
however, can be tracked with comparisons against control and treatment groups.  
Table 10 mirrors the estimation of health changes from T-1 to T+3 seen 
previously in Tables 4, 5 and 6.  A separate comparison is made for those who stay in 
employment, and those who leave the workforce. There is no evidence that those who 
subsequently change roles become healthier. The only clear outcomes arise for those 
who leave the workforce completely, but they show a worsening of health.  Similar 
effects are found in the changes in health across other time periods.  This appears to 
indicate that those omitted from our main analysis are not getting health benefits 
either; if anything, the promotees here seem to be getting less healthy through time.   
Finally, Table 11 suggests that the inclusion of an income variable does not 
materially alter the coefficient in the Doctor Visits result for managers.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper is a longitudinal inquiry into the hypothesis that status makes 
people healthy.  It draws upon data from a nationally representative sample of 
employees.  We cannot find persuasive evidence that promotion improves a person’s 
health.  We conclude in the full sample that after being promoted the mental health of 
managers typically deteriorates, and in a way that goes beyond merely a short-term 
change.  The paper’s negative results do not appear to be the product of Type II 
errors.   
  18By exploiting an occupational-role question in the British Household Panel 
Survey, which gives an indication of a person’s degree of workplace seniority, the 
paper first replicates the cross-section association between health and occupational 
status that is commonly found in previous writings.  It then attempts to probe 
causality.  The analysis does this by following individuals who undergo a promotion, 
and by trying to discern any health differences among them, when compared to a 
control group, before and after job promotion.  Once other controls are included in the 
regression equation, few or no differences are observable across the two groups.  A 
promotion to the role of supervisor, in particular, apparently does not increase a 
person’s physical or mental health.   
The exception to these broadly negative implications for the theory that 
improved occupational status brings health benefits is illustrated in our difference-in-
difference results in Table 5.  Those promoted in time period T to the role of manager 
do alter in one way.  From time T, they visit their doctor approximately 10% less 
frequently.  On its own this finding should be treated with some caution.  As observed 
in our Table 3, the visits-to-the-doctor variable has not only the lowest association 
with the occupational status variable but it may also be associated with the time 
available to care for one’s health. The other main finding -- that managers become 
more stressed -- is perhaps supportive of this explanation.  
In contrast to the interesting work of Sapolsky (2004), we therefore do not 
uncover evidence that status-to-health causality extends to humans.  Such results are 
reminiscent of sceptical conclusions in Ruhm (2000) and Snyder and Evans (2006). 
The paper’s results should be treated cautiously.  Our measures of health are 
imperfect; we can follow people for only a small number of years after they gain extra 
seniority; job promotion is not randomly assigned in the real world, and, although not 
  19confirmed by any of our paper’s checks, might in principle be correlated in some 
unusual way8 with later alterations in general health status; it is possible that in period 
T-1 there are individuals who correctly sense they will be promoted and have already, 
if only subconsciously, discounted that and thus gained a health boost prior to time 
period T’s gain in status.   
We are not sure how to reconcile these results with the more supportive ones 
that have been found, using data on Oscar and Nobel Prize winners and nominees, in 
the work of Redelmeier and Singh (2001) and Rablen and Oswald (2007).  One 
conjecture might be that it takes a major change in status to make a difference to 
physical and mental health.  Perhaps health does not respond in a linear dose-response 
way, but rather is a strongly convex function of status.  Perhaps status works its 
effects over decades rather than years.  Further longitudinal research will be needed 
before we have a deep understanding of the causes of the status-health correlation 
found in cross-section data. 
  
 
                                                 
8 Here our negative findings have one interpretive advantage: the likely bias goes in the other direction.  
If promotion really improves people’s health, then to make sense of our results using epidemiological 
theory it would be necessary to believe, arguably against common intuition, that individuals with a high 
probability of deteriorating health are the ones most likely to gain an increase in workplace seniority.  
  20Appendix 
Income’s Inclusion in the Regression Equations 
Does inclusion of income change anything? In the main analysis, it was excluded, since an income rise 
is likely to accompany a promotion. The introduction of income, in Table 10, adds almost nothing to 
the effect of the promoted dummy. 
 
Sample Construction 
All three promoted groups are of interest in the analysis: those promoted from non-supervisor to both 
supervisor and manager, and those promoted from supervisor to manager. Individuals in employment 
and indicating their position at T were sourced from every wave of the BHPS. Each observation at T 
was tracked from T-1 through to T+3, and where available, the health measures taken. Occupational 
position changes were then analyzed and two groups, both control and treatment, created. 
Control Groups 
A control group of those not promoted is required. Those who maintained the same position (non-
supervisor or supervisor) for the full five years were a control group for the relevant promoted group.  
Treatment Groups 
Those who were initially in the control group at T-1 but promoted at T, and maintained this until at 
least T+3, made up the treatment group.  Inevitably, since requiring a full five years of data, waves 1, 
12, 13 and 14 could not be included. This makes an overall sample size of approximately 15,000 
observations. It is a balanced panel: individuals give answers to the health question for each of the five 
years. Thus the sample size varies depending on the health variable under analysis. 
 
Those promoted at T but who did not remain in the promoted position for all three years were 
separately coded -- depending on whether observed as still working, changing roles, or leaving work 
entirely. These groups are used in the analysis in Section 5.  
 
By the nature of our sample construction, some individuals appear as multiple observations. This 
occurs in two circumstances.  First, an individual may maintain a role for longer than 5 years.  Second, 
a single individual may enter on a number of occasions if they experience a break in employment of 
which at least five years of employment exist either side. In both scenarios it is difficult to know which 
observation should be included as all spells contain valuable information. Both are kept as observations 
in the analysis. 
 
Definition of GHQ Mental Ill-health 
 
A GHQ score, defined to lie between zero and 36, is a psychiatric screening instrument that is as an 
amalgamation of answers to the questions:  Have you recently: 
1.  Been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing? 
2.  Lost much sleep over worry? 
3.  Felt that you are playing a useful part in things? 
4.  Felt capable of making decisions about things? 
5.  Felt constantly under strain? 
6.  Felt you could not overcome your difficulties? 
7.  Been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities? 
8.  Been able to face up to your problems? 
9.  Been feeling unhappy and depressed? 
10.  Been losing confidence in yourself? 
11.  Been thinking of yourself as a worthless person? 
12.  Been feeling reasonably happy all things considered? 
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  25Notes to Tables 
 
Regressions include observations across all years separated by promoted to 
manager/supervisor groups where specified.  
 




The individual’s rating of their health status over the last twelve months, 
where 1=excellent, 2=good, 3=fair, 4=poor, 5=very poor 
 





The number of visits to their General Practitioner in the past year. This 
is a categorical variable. None, one or two, three to five, six to ten, or ten 
plus are the available options. These are recoded to be the minimum 
value in each category (0, 1, 3, 6 and 10). This is an underestimation, but 







This variable is a 1 to 36 scale of the level of mental strain obtained 
from the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ). There are 12, zero to 3 
point questions that include; among others, the individuals ability to 
overcome problems, their decision capabilities, sleep, concentration and 




Individual’s managerial duties are neither manager or supervisory, yet 
they are still in employment 
Supervisor 
 
Individual’s managerial duties are that of a supervisor or foreman 
Manager 
 
Individual’s managerial duties are that of a manager 
 
Promoted at T  
 
Individuals promoted at T (to supervisor or manager) and remained until 
T+3  
 
Promoted at T but left workforce 
 
Individuals promoted at T (to supervisor or manager) but did not remain 
until T+3 as they left the workforce at some point 
 
Promoted at T but subsequently changed role 
 
 
Individuals promoted at T (to supervisor or manager) but did not remain 











Individual is married (excluded dummy: all non married individuals 
including single, widow, divorced and separated) 
Smoker 
 





Specifies the individual’s highest level of education obtained.(College 
and Graduate dummies used with excluded dummy for those who either 
left after high school or dropped out) 
 
Logarithm of income (at 2005 living costs) 
 
The logarithm of an individual’s own annual income, with all years, 
deflated to 2005 living costs 
   
 
  26Table 1: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Three Ill-health Measures     + 
  Subjective Ill Health  Visits to the 
Doctor 
Mental Strain 
Subjective Ill-health  1 -  - 
Visits to the Doctor  0.40 (n=16864) 1  - 
Mental Strain  0.27 (n=15957) 0.20  (n=15915) 1 
 
+    all coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level 
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Table 2: Ill-health Over Time within the Whole Sample 




Deviation N Mean 
Standard 




T-1  17724 2.01  0.80  16881 1.77  2.26  15974  10.63  4.74 
T  17724 2.02  0.80  16881 1.77  2.29  15974  10.76  4.77 
T+1  17724 2.04  0.81  16881 1.81  2.34  15974  10.85  4.85 
T+2  17724 2.06  0.81  16881 1.84  2.37  15974  10.89  4.89 
T+3  17724 2.08  0.82  16881 1.87  2.42  15974  11.02  4.95 
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Table 3: Cross-section Regression Equations for Subjective Ill-health, Visits to the Doctor, and Mental Strain 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
  Dependent Variable: 
Explanatory Variables  Subjective Ill Health 
  
Visits to the Doctor 
  
Mental Strain (GHQ) 
    
Manager  -0.189 -0.168 -0.147 -0.276 -0.135 -0.134 -0.746 -0.652 -0.713
  (6.36)** (5.72)** (4.93)** (3.17)** (1.58) (1.52) (4.02)** (3.55)** (3.79)**
Supervisor  -0.058 -0.049 -0.047 -0.064 0.085 0.068 -0.315 -0.207 -0.195
  (2.71)** (2.30)* (2.19)* (1.02) (1.37) (1.08) (2.36)* (1.56) (1.46)
 













Age    0.004 0.006 -0.053 -0.057 0.258 0.261
    (1.34) (1.80) (5.46)** (5.56)** (12.47)**  (11.84)**
Age-squared    -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003
    (0.51) (1.01) (5.31)** (5.44)** (11.75)**  (11.17)**
Female    0.049 0.043 0.903 0.933 1.364 1.331
    (4.05)** (3.46)** (25.75)** (23.74)** (18.12)** (15.77)**
 
Married    -0.016 -0.018 0.043 0.043 -0.512 -0.505
    (1.11) (1.28) (1.05) (1.06) (5.80)** (5.71)**
Smoker    0.170 0.166 0.075 0.071 0.120 0.152
    (12.67)**  (12.27)** (1.92) (1.78) (1.43) (1.79)
Education Level 
College   0.000 0.061 0.108
  (0.00) (1.45) (1.21)
Graduate  -0.072 -0.126 0.418
  (3.20)** (1.90) (2.98)**
Logarithm of Income (at 
2005 living costs) 
-0.006 0.021 -0.033
  (1.95) (1.39) (1.05)
 
Constant  2.031 1.757 1.765 1.792 2.244 2.072 10.817 5.094 5.265
  (315.03)** (27.41)** (27.23)** (94.70)** (11.96)** (10.86)** (267.04)** (12.64)** (12.86)**
Observations  17724 17724 17689 16881 16881 16848 15974 15974 15943
R-squared  0.0026 0.04 0.04 0.006 0.04 0.04 0.0013 0.03 0.03
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
This is a full-sample regression that combines all promoted control and treatment group samples. Subsequent analysis separates these. Table 4: Ill-health Among the Non-Promoted Non-Supervisors and those Promoted to Supervisor (at time T)  
 
Subjective Ill Health        Numbers subject to rounding     ^ significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 










Difference in Mean 
across Groups  
(with controls) 
T-1  15425 2.02  0.80  330 1.97  0.81  -0.05  -0.05 
T  15425 2.03  0.80  330 1.94  0.77  -0.09*  -0.08^ 
T+1  15425 2.06  0.82  330 1.99  0.78  -0.07  -0.06 
T+2  15425 2.07  0.81  330 2.08  0.81  0.01  0.02 
T+3  15425 2.09  0.82  330 2.04  0.81  -0.04  -0.04 
Change Over Time               
(T)-(T-1)   15425 0.01  0.82  330 -0.03  0.86  -0.04 -0.03 
(T+1)-(T-1)  15425 0.03  0.87  330 0.02  0.93  -0.01 -0.02 
(T+2)-(T-1)  15425 0.04  0.89  330 0.11  0.96  0.07 0.07 
(T+3)-(T-1)  15425 0.06  0.91  330 0.08  0.95  0.01 0.01 
 
Visits to the Doctor 










Difference in Mean 
across Groups  
(with controls) 
T-1  14687 1.78  2.27  314 1.56  1.82  -0.22^  -0.11 
T  14687 1.79  2.30  314 1.54  1.90  -0.25^  -0.14 
T+1  14687 1.83  2.35  314 1.75  2.40  -0.09  0.03 
T+2  14687 1.85  2.37  314 1.89  2.30  0.04  0.17 
T+3  14687 1.89  2.43  314 1.92  2.41  0.04  0.16 
Change Over Time               
(T)-(T-1)   14687 0.01  2.31  314 -0.02  1.89  -0.03 -0.03 
(T+1)-(T-1)  14687 0.05  2.55  314 0.19  2.27  0.13 0.14 
(T+2)-(T-1)  14687 0.07  2.60  314 0.33  2.51  0.26^ 0.28^ 
(T+3)-(T-1)  14687 0.11  2.69  314 0.36  2.60  0.26^ 0.27^ 
 
Mental Strain (GHQ) 










Difference in Mean 
across Groups  
(with controls) 
T-1  13874 10.68  4.76  296 10.40  4.60  -0.28  -0.04 
T  13874 10.82  4.83  296 10.21  4.52  -0.61*  -0.38 
T+1  13874 10.89  4.89  296 10.44  4.74  -0.44  -0.22 
T+2  13874 10.93  4.91  296 10.80  4.90  -0.13  -0.08 
T+3  13874 11.04  4.96  296 10.56  4.82  -0.48^  -0.28 
Change Over Time               
(T)-(T-1)   13874 0.14  4.96  296 -0.19  4.74  -0.33 -0.34 
(T+1)-(T-1)  13874 0.21  5.22  296 0.05  4.80  -0.16 -0.19 
(T+2)-(T-1)  13874 0.25  5.43  296 0.40  5.77  0.15 0.10 
(T+3)-(T-1)  13874 0.36  5.55  296 0.16  5.45  -0.20 -0.26 
 
  30Table 5: Ill-health Among the Non-Promoted Supervisors and those Promoted to Manager (at time T)  
 
Subjective Ill Health        Numbers subject to rounding     ^ significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 










Difference in Mean 
across Groups  
(with controls) 
T-1  1209 1.98  0.81  436  1.88  0.83  -0.10*  -0.08^ 
T  1209 1.98  0.82  436  1.88  0.79  -0.10*  -0.08^ 
T+1  1209 2.03  0.82  436  1.86  0.75  -0.17**  -0.13** 
T+2  1209 2.04  0.80  436  1.94  0.80  -0.10*  -0.09^ 
T+3  1209 2.05  0.81  436  1.97  0.79  -0.09^  -0.05 
Change Over Time               
(T)-(T-1)   1209 0.00  0.79  436  0.00  0.82  0.00 -0.00 
(T+1)-(T-1)  1209 0.04  0.85  436  -0.02  0.86  -0.06 -0.05 
(T+2)-(T-1)  1209 0.06  0.85  436  0.06  0.89  0.00 -0.01 
(T+3)-(T-1)  1209 0.07  0.86  436  0.08  0.92  0.02 0.02 
 
Visits to the Doctor 










Difference in Mean 
across Groups  
(with controls) 
T-1  1153 1.73  2.32  418  1.70  2.31  -0.03  -0.05 
T  1153 1.78  2.43  418  1.55  2.24  -0.23^  -0.27^ 
T+1  1153 1.78  2.45  418  1.45  1.92  -0.32*  -0.31* 
T+2  1153 1.81  2.50  418  1.66  2.22  -0.15  -0.13 
T+3  1153 1.87  2.57  418  1.65  2.12  -0.22  -0.15 
Change Over Time               
(T)-(T-1)   1153 0.05  2.18  418  -0.16  2.43  -0.20 -0.21 
(T+1)-(T-1)  1153 0.05  2.46  418  -0.25  2.55  -0.30^ -0.26^ 
(T+2)-(T-1)  1153 0.08  2.58  418  -0.04  2.53  -0.12 -0.08 
(T+3)-(T-1)  1153 0.14  2.65  418  -0.06  2.55  -0.19 -0.13 
 
Mental Strain (GHQ) 










Difference in Mean 
across Groups  
(with controls) 
T-1  1112 10.42  4.23  395  10.31  4.74  -0.10  -0.13 
T  1112 10.58  4.34  395  10.23  4.22  -0.35  -0.33 
T+1  1112 10.53  4.44  395  10.76  4.58  0.23  0.18 
T+2  1112 10.60  4.56  395  10.56  4.81  -0.04  -0.19 
T+3  1112 10.86  4.77  395  11.08  5.15  0.22  0.21 
Change Over Time               
(T)-(T-1)   1112 0.16  4.34  395  -0.09  5.26  -0.25 -0.19 
(T+1)-(T-1)  1112 0.11  4.61  395  0.45  5.37  0.34 0.31 
(T+2)-(T-1)  1112 0.18  4.70  395  0.24  5.63  0.06 -0.08 
(T+3)-(T-1)  1112 0.44  5.05  395  0.76  5.90  0.32 0.34 
 
  31Table 6: Ill-health Among the Non-Promoted Non-supervisors and those Promoted to Manager (at time T)  
 
Subjective Ill Health        Numbers subject to rounding     ^ significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 










Difference in Mean 
across Groups  
(with controls) 
T-1  15425 2.02  0.80  324 1.86  0.81  -0.16**  -0.13** 
T  15425 2.03  0.80  324 1.79  0.74  -0.24**  -0.19** 
T+1  15425 2.06  0.82  324 1.84  0.72  -0.22**  -0.17** 
T+2  15425 2.07  0.81  324 1.88  0.80  -0.19**  -0.15** 
T+3  15425 2.09  0.82  324 1.89  0.77  -0.20**  -0.15** 
Change Over Time               
(T)-(T-1)   15425 0.01  0.82  324 -0.07  0.83  -0.08^ -0.06 
(T+1)-(T-1)  15425 0.03  0.87  324 -0.02  0.85  -0.06 -0.04 
(T+2)-(T-1)  15425 0.04  0.89  324 0.01  0.87  -0.03 -0.03 
(T+3)-(T-1)  15425 0.06  0.91  324 0.02  0.88  -0.04 -0.03 
 
Visits to the Doctor 










Difference in Mean 
across Groups  
(with controls) 
T-1  14687 1.78  2.27  309 1.69  2.24  -0.09  0.10 
T  14687 1.79  2.30  309 1.47  1.78  -0.32*  -0.15 
T+1  14687 1.83  2.35  309 1.39  1.64  -0.45**  -0.25^ 
T+2  14687 1.85  2.37  309 1.51  2.03  -0.34*  -0.13 
T+3  14687 1.89  2.43  309 1.46  1.98  -0.43**  -0.21 
Change Over Time               
(T)-(T-1)   14687 0.01  2.31  309 -0.22  2.07  -0.23^ -0.25^ 
(T+1)-(T-1)  14687 0.05  2.55  309 -0.30  2.30  -0.35* -0.36* 
(T+2)-(T-1)  14687 0.07  2.60  309 -0.18  2.46  -0.25 -0.23 
(T+3)-(T-1)  14687 0.11  2.69  309 -0.23  2.53  -0.34* -0.32* 
 
Mental Strain (GHQ) 










Difference in Mean 
across Groups  
(with controls) 
T-1  13874 10.68  4.76  297 10.00  5.42  -0.68*  -0.55* 
T  13874 10.82  4.83  297  9.86  4.66  -0.96**  -0.85** 
T+1  13874 10.89  4.89  297 10.58  4.89  -0.31  -0.19 
T+2  13874 10.93  4.91  297 10.99  5.47  0.06  0.16 
T+3  13874 11.04  4.96  297 11.15  5.25  0.12  0.20 
Change Over Time               
(T)-(T-1)   13874 0.14  4.96  297 -0.13  5.45  -0.28 -0.32 
(T+1)-(T-1)  13874 0.21  5.22  297 0.58  5.93  0.37 0.34 
(T+2)-(T-1)  13874 0.25  5.43  297 0.99  6.14  0.74* 0.66* 
(T+3)-(T-1)  13874 0.36  5.55  297 1.16  6.79  0.80* 0.70* 
 
  32Table 7: Difference-in-Difference ((T+3)-(T-1)) Estimates (with controls) for Individuals 
Working in the Public Sector and in Manufacturing Industry  
 
Promoted Group  Health Measure  Public Sector (# in 
treatment/control) 
Manufacturing 
Industry (# in 
treatment/control) 
Subjective Ill-Health  0.01 (8/420)  0.08 (67/2200) 
Visits to the Doctor  -0.33 (8/409)  0.28 (65/2092) 
Promoted to 
Supervisor 
Mental Strain  -4.45* (8/398)  -0.72 (62/1974) 
      
Subjective Ill-Health  -0.04 (14/33)  -0.22 (37/244) 
Visits to the Doctor  0.05 (13/32)  -0.35 (37/232) 
Promoted to Manager 
(from supervisor) 
Mental Strain  -4.26 (12/32)  -0.04 (35/223) 
      
Subjective Ill-Health  0.64^ (8/420)  -0.20 (29/2200) 
Visits to the Doctor  0.21 (7/409)  -0.47 (29/2092) 
Promoted to Manager 
(from non-supervisor) 
Mental Strain  -0.48 (7/398)  0.97 (29/1974) 
      
Subjective Ill-Health  0.12 (30/453)   
Visits to the Doctor  -0.27 (28/441)   
Any Promotion 
Mental Strain  -2.73* (27/430)   
^ significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
As an aid to reading this table, the top left number of 0.01 (8/420) means that in the public sector a promotion to supervisor increases subjective ill-
health by 0.01 points, and there are 8 people in this category, with 420 in the control category.  
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Table 8: Difference-in-difference estimates for individuals that stay at the same address across all 
5 years ((T+3)-(T-1)) and those that stay in the promoted position up until T+5 ((T+5)-(T-1)) 
 
Promoted Group  Health Measure  Stay at the same 
address across all 5 
years ((T+3)-(T-1)) 
Remain in promoted 
position until T+5 
((T+5)-(T-1)) 
Subjective Ill-Health  0.04 (175/9377)  0.01 (122/7965) 
Visits to the Doctor  0.39^ (175/9349)  0.25 (117/7607) 
Promoted to 
Supervisor 
Mental Strain  -0.28 (164/8762)  0.38 (109/7181) 
      
Subjective Ill-Health  -0.07 (233/779)  -0.13^ (229/469) 
Visits to the Doctor  -0.09 (234/774)  -0.20 (220/456) 
Promoted to Manager 
(from supervisor) 
Mental Strain  0.29 (220/744)  -0.52 (206/451) 
      
Subjective Ill-Health  0.01 (149/9377)  -0.02 (151/7965) 
Visits to the Doctor  -0.61 (149/9349)  -0.29 (143/7607) 
Promoted to Manager 
(from non-supervisor) 
Mental Strain  0.63 (143/8762)  -0.01 (136/7181) 
^ significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level Table 9: Probit Equations using Change in Health from T-1 to T as a Predictor of Promotion  
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Dependent Variable:  Promotion to Supervisor at T  Promotion to Manager at T (from Supervisor) 
Promotion to Manager at T (from Non-Supervisor) 
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GP Mental  Strain
     
Explanatory Variables 
at T 
     
 
 
Health change from 



















  (0.84) (0.24) (1.19) (0.30) (1.52) (0.71) (1.98)* (2.09)* (1.09)
 
Age  -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
  (2.94)** (2.66)** (2.46)* (3.34)** (3.72)** (3.49)** (1.39) (1.56) (1.34)
Female  -0.215 -0.215 -0.217 0.154 0.148 0.139 -0.263 -0.257 -0.257
  (4.68)** (4.57)** (4.47)** (2.19)* (2.05)* (1.89) (5.39)** (5.14)**  (5.05)** 
 
Married  0.028 0.016 0.025 -0.118 -0.108 -0.108 0.164 0.173 0.162
  (0.53) (0.29) (0.45) (1.52) (1.36) (1.32) (2.91)** (3.00)** (2.75)**
Smoker  0.037 0.038 0.047 0.064 0.092 0.107 -0.027 -0.004 0.005
  (0.71) (0.73) (0.87) (0.77) (1.09) (1.24) (0.46) (0.07) (0.08)
Education Level 
College   0.099 0.085 0.096 0.297 0.304 0.288 0.369 0.376 0.354
  (1.89) (1.57) (1.73) (3.90)** (3.90)** (3.62)** (6.40)** (6.34)** (5.86)**
Graduate  0.067 0.063 0.009 1.291 1.312 1.333 0.992 1.009 0.979




Constant  -1.738 -1.745 -1.762 -0.420 -0.369 -0.398 -2.162 -2.166 -2.161
  (19.95)** (19.43)** (19.04)** (2.63)** (2.25)* (2.37)* (21.50)** (20.84)** (20.45)**
     
Observations  15755 15001 14170 1645 1571 1507 15749 14996  14171 
Pseudo R-squared  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Promoted at T 
0.014 0.277 -0.242 0.015 -0.144 0.336 -0.044 -0.298 0.716
  (0.28) (1.77) (0.74) (0.28) (0.91) (1.01) (0.86) (1.91) (2.16)*
Promoted at T but left 
workforce 
0.065 0.321 0.124 -0.060 0.108 0.341 0.049 0.425 0.079
  (1.37) (2.20)* (0.40) (0.84) (0.49) (0.75) (0.72) (1.99)* (0.17)
0.010 -0.032 0.284 0.009 -0.115 -0.417 -0.051 -0.148 0.176 Promoted at T but 
subsequently changed 
role 
(0.42) (0.46) (1.92) (0.20) (0.86) (1.50) (1.34) (1.26) (0.70)
 
Age  0.001 0.008 -0.026 0.002 0.005 -0.014 0.001 0.007 -0.028
  (1.98)* (4.06)** (6.28)** (1.16) (0.84) (1.25) (1.70) (3.63)** (6.34)**
Female  -0.006 0.024 -0.029 0.033 0.138 -0.080 -0.002 0.028 -0.063
  (0.45) (0.57) (0.32) (0.92) (1.25) (0.35) (0.17) (0.65) (0.68)
 
Married  0.021 -0.086 0.442 -0.005 -0.000 0.172 0.032 -0.069 0.444
  (1.36) (1.81) (4.40)** (0.12) (0.00) (0.67) (2.01)* (1.42) (4.23)**
Smoker  0.004 0.081 -0.129 0.147 0.391 0.005 0.008 0.058 -0.020
  (0.24) (1.71) (1.29) (3.45)** (3.00)** (0.02) (0.48) (1.19) (0.19)
Education Level 
College   0.002 -0.054 -0.014 0.046 -0.073 0.238 0.015 -0.024 0.022
  (0.10) (1.06) (0.13) (1.13) (0.59) (0.93) (0.90) (0.46) (0.20)
Graduate  -0.029 -0.029 0.051 0.032 -0.140 -0.227 0.002 -0.045 0.043
  (1.13) (0.37) (0.32) (0.58) (0.81) (0.64) (0.09) (0.58) (0.26)
 
Constant  0.006 -0.175 1.157 -0.081 -0.178 0.868 -0.004 -0.159 1.188
  (0.23) (2.09)* (6.60)** (0.95) (0.68) (1.61) (0.13) (1.86) (6.49)**
 
Observations  17936 17065 16127 2572 2448 2358 16530 15713 14857
Pseudo R-squared  0.0008 0.0019 0.0033 0.0058 0.0069 0.0042 0.0009 0.0018 0.0035
Table 10: Regressions Showing Health Differences across Promoted Groups, and those who Subsequently Left the Workforce or Changed Role 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
All regressions match those found in Tables 6 through 11 (Column 9) except with the extra individuals who did not maintain their promotions. 
 
  
Table 11: Regressions Showing Health Differences with Income’s Inclusion for the Promoted-to-Manager from Non-Supervisor Control 
and Treatment groups 
 








GP at T 
 
 












at T Difference 
(T+3)-(T-1) 
           
Explanatory 


















  (4.18)** (1.19)  (3.13)**  (0.58)  (2.16)*  (2.04)* 
            
Logarithm of 
income (at 2005 
living costs) 
-0.005 0.010  0.069  -0.002  0.022  0.040 
  (1.64) (0.71)  (2.17)*  (0.43)  (1.26)  (1.09) 
            
Age  0.002 -0.005  0.020  0.002  0.008  -0.027 
  (3.97)** (2.75)**  (5.07)**  (2.67)**  (3.76)**  (5.91)** 
Female  0.039 0.907  1.527  -0.006  0.059  -0.016 
  (3.00)** (22.15)**  (17.12)**  (0.40)  (1.21)  (0.16) 
            
Married  -0.005 0.048  -0.196  0.027  -0.090  0.453 
  (0.35) (1.15)  (2.13)*  (1.65)  (1.80)  (4.23)** 
Smoker  0.178 0.095  0.203  0.010  0.061  -0.020 
  (12.47)** (2.27)*  (2.23)*  (0.63)  (1.23)  (0.19) 
Education Level            
College   0.003 0.073  0.192  0.034  -0.008  0.049 
  (0.22) (1.62)  (1.96)*  (1.91)  (0.15)  (0.43) 
Graduate  -0.069 -0.154  0.489  0.025  -0.009  0.017 
  (2.89)** (2.19)*  (3.23)**  (0.93)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
            
Constant  1.844 1.370  8.875  0.039  0.009  1.681 
  (53.37)** (11.83)**  (35.05)**  (1.01)  (0.07)  (5.68)** 
            
Observations  15715 14964  14141  15715  14964  14141 
R-squared  0.04 0.04  0.03  0.04  0.0036  0.0073 
    Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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